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Abstract
This paper looks at the epistemological foundations of knowl-
edge representations embodied in retrieval languages. It considers ques-
tions such as the validity of knowledge representations and their effective-
ness for the purposes of retrieval and automation. The knowledge
representations it considers are derived from three theories of meaning that
have dominated twentieth-century philosophy.
The discipline of philosophy impacts other knowledge disciplines, par-
ticularly in the theoretical constructs they employ. The purpose of this pa-
per is to explore how epistemology, that branch of philosophy concerned with
how and what we know, has contributed to the design of knowledge repre-
sentations embodied in retrieval languages designed for organizing informa-
tion. Different retrieval languages make different presuppositions about what
is meant by knowledge. These differences give rise to questions such as
• How valid are the knowledge representations embodied in different
retrieval languages, i.e., how well do they do what they purport to do,
i.e., to represent knowledge?
• How effective are they in facilitating the achievement of the objectives
of a retrieval language: collocation, discrimination, and navigation?
• How amenable are they to automation and semantic interoperability?
In the course of the twentieth century, the problem of what and how we
know has been dealt with through language analysis and theories of mean-
ing. Three theories of meaning are especially relevant to the discussion of
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knowledge representations: Operationalism, the Referential or Picture the-
ory of meaning, and the Contextual or Instrumental theory of meaning.
Operationalism
Operationalism is a theory of meaning emanating from the philosophy
of logical positivism. Logical positivism, an extreme form of empiricism,
dominated philosophy of science in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Empiricism holds that all knowledge is derivable from experience, i.e.,
from sense perceptions. For instance: our knowledge of time as used as a
variable in a mathematical equation, e.g., v = d/t, is ultimately derivable from
propositions recording our sensory experience of time. The experience
upon which knowledge is based must be objective. This condition is ex-
pressed by the Principle of Veriﬁability, which states that in order to be
meaningful, a proposition must be capable of veriﬁcation. The totality of
knowledge consists of all meaningful propositions. Examples of nonmean-
ingful propositions are those of an ethical, religious, or “esthetic kind,” e.g.,
“truth is beauty” is not meaningful because it cannot be veriﬁed, therefore,
it is excluded from the corpus of knowledge.
For a proposition to be veriﬁed, the concepts within it need to be
deﬁned operationally, i.e., they need to be deﬁned constructively. In prac-
tice, deﬁning a concept operationally often means deﬁning it as a variable.
Deﬁning concepts as variables enables a discipline to advance. The most
celebrated example of this phenomenon is Einstein’s use of operational
deﬁnitions in his analysis of simultaneity (Bridgman, 1938, p. 7). A graph-
ic example of the practicality of operational deﬁnitions is that of Edding-
ton’s elephant sliding down a hill of wet grass (Eddington, 1929, pp. 251
ff). Eddington asks us to consider the mass of this sliding elephant. Con-
ceivably it could be regarded as a property of the elephant (“a condition
which we vaguely describe as ‘ponderosity’”) (p. 251); on the other hand,
it could be regarded as a pointer reading on a scale, i.e., two tons. It may
be intuitive to think of mass as a property, but Eddington observes: “we shall
not get much further that way; the nature of the external world is inscruta-
ble, and we shall only plunge into a quagmire of indescribables” (p. 251).
He goes on to argue that it is more productive to regard mass as a pointer
reading, i.e., as a value of a variable. Not only does this give a method for
testing the proposition “the elephant weighs two tons”; it enables the two
tons of the elephant to be related to other pointer readings, i.e., to values
of other variables, such as velocity, coefﬁcient of friction, etc. Operational
deﬁnitions, by providing empirical correlates for concepts in the form of
variables, allow variables to be related one to another. Propositions that
express relationships among variables are “scientiﬁc” in the sense that they
take the form of generalizations and serve an explanatory function: if ver-
iﬁed, they assume the character of laws; if awaiting veriﬁcation, they have
the status of hypotheses.
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To the extent that problems of organizing and retrieving information
are deﬁnitional in nature, solutions to them can be approached by intro-
ducing operational deﬁnitions. An example of a productive operational
deﬁnition is the precision-recall measure, which was developed to measure
the degree to which a given retrieval system does or does not achieve its
discrimination and collocation objectives (Cleverdon, 1962). Precision
measures the degree to which the system delivers only relevant documents
and is deﬁned as the number of relevant documents retrieved divided by
the total number of documents retrieved, expressed as a ratio or percent-
age. Recall measures the degree to which the system delivers all relevant
documents and is deﬁned as the number of relevant documents retrieved
divided by the total number of relevant documents, again expressed as a
percentage or ratio. The use of these measures in quantifying the discrim-
ination and collocation objectives makes it possible to generalize about the
impact of various factors on retrieval effectiveness. One of the earliest fac-
tors studied was indexing depth, the number of index terms assigned to a
document. The more index terms assigned—or, alternatively, the more
access points a document admits of—the higher the recall, the lower the
precision. This is, in part, the scientiﬁc explanation of why keyword search-
ing nearly always results in infoglut.
Operational deﬁnitions are constructive; however, not all operational
deﬁnitions interpret concepts as variables. Some are constructive in the
procedural sense of specifying a deﬁniendum, i.e., stipulating how the
object being deﬁned can be recognized—the conditions needed to identi-
fy it. For example, a particular kind of cake, such as a Tosca torte, might be
constructively or operationally deﬁned by its recipe.
Procedural deﬁnitions are useful when it comes to deﬁning the ontol-
ogy of a retrieval language—its entities, attributes, and relationships. Con-
sider, for instance, the entity work, which ﬁgures in the language used to de-
scribe information-bearing documents. Conceptually a work is an abstract
Platonic concept. A work consists of a certain amount of delimited informa-
tion—some piece of intellectual or artistic content. Operationally, a work
can be deﬁned in terms of the procedures to be followed to construct a set
of documents that contain essentially the same information. A constructive
deﬁnition would specify how members of the work set can be identiﬁed, e.g.,
as being a transformation of a given ur-document by relationships that pre-
serve identity, such as revision, abridgement, or translation. Without an op-
erational deﬁnition of a work it would not be possible for a retrieval system
to automatically collocate, i.e., form the set of—all documents containing
essentially the same information, e.g., all editions of Dickens’ Bleak House.
Another entity that has been procedurally deﬁned is subject. Early deﬁ-
nitions, beginning in the 1960s, were based on simple word frequencies,
e.g., the more frequently a substantive word occurred in a document, the
greater the probability it was indicative of what the document was about.
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Over time the operational techniques used to identify subjects have become
increasingly sophisticated, incorporating different types of frequency dis-
tributions, parsing, and grammatical analyses and inferences based on sim-
ilarity algorithms. In addition to their usefulness in automatic indexing,
these techniques have the potential to improve indexing consistency and
are a sine qua non for the automatic merging and translating of knowledge
representations.
Useful as they may be, nevertheless questions can be raised about op-
erational deﬁnitions: (i) how valid are they, i.e., how well do they deﬁne
what they intend to deﬁne, e.g., concepts such as precision, recall, work,
and subject? and (ii) How valid are the knowledge representations that
depend on operational deﬁnitions, i.e., how expressive are they in their
representation of knowledge? Insofar as they introduce quantiﬁcation,
operational deﬁnitions are subject to the charge that they oversimplify. For
instance, the precision and recall measures have been faulted for oversim-
plifying the subjective concept of relevance. Automatic techniques for iden-
tifying subjects of documents have been faulted for being term- rather than
concept-based. All operational deﬁnitions lack validity, to some degrees but
this does mean they are ineffective. For instance, to improve keyword search-
ing, operational procedures used to automate the assignment of descrip-
tors to documents are advantageously being adapted for use in online
search engines. In the pursuit of knowledge, oversimpliﬁcation and abstrac-
tion can sometimes be valuable in clearing away confusing linguistic under-
brush to get at a clear picture of a phenomenon: outstanding examples are
the precision and recall measures that developed half a century ago and
continue to prove productive in advancing our understanding of the fac-
tors that contribute to retrieval effectiveness.
The Referential or Picture Theory of Meaning
The referential or picture theory of meaning also derives from an
empiricist view of knowledge. This theory is consistent with, but less radi-
cal than, that of the logical positivists in that it does not demand veriﬁabil-
ity. Its chief (and most brilliant) exponent was Ludwig Wittgenstein in his
Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1961/1921). The basic tenet of the picture theory
is that the extensional meaning of a word is its referent. For example, the
extensional meaning of the word “butterﬂy” is the set of all past, present,
and future butterﬂies. Words whose referents are things in the real world
can be taught by ostensive deﬁnition, simply by pointing to their referents.
A child learns the meaning of “butterﬂy” when someone points to a but-
terﬂy and says the word. For words that have no ostensive reality, referents
are postulated in the form of concepts, e.g., the referent of the general noun
“beauty” is the concept of beauty. Words are contained in propositions, and
these propositions, deriving directly or indirectly from sensory experience,
express properties and relationships. Empirical propositions picture reali-
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ty. A proposition has empirical meaning if and only if it corresponds to
(pictures) reality. “Snow is white” is a true proposition if and only if snow is
white. Matters of fact or states of affairs are expressed in true propositions—
those that represent real knowledge about the world, e.g., “Snow is white,”
“Tosca was written by Puccini,” and “Afghanistan borders on China.” Such
propositions contain words whose meanings are relatively ﬁxed and can be
formulated in ﬁrst-order predicate calculus. Knowledge consists of the to-
tality of true propositions—the totality of accurate pictures of the world.
In addition to propositions that picture the world, the empiricists rec-
ognized those that are tautological, in the sense of expressing logical rela-
tionships among propositions. It was David Hume who ﬁrst distinguished
the two types of propositions: those that express matters of fact and those
that express relationships among ideas. An example of a tautological rela-
tionship is the equivalence relationship, e.g., “Bachelors are unmarried
men.” Another is the logical relation of inclusion, e.g., “All parrots are
birds.” This relationship is logical in that it forms the basis of deductive
reasoning as exempliﬁed by the classical syllogism: “All parrots are birds.
Polly is a parrot. Therefore, Polly is a bird.” Logical hierarchy employing
the inclusion relationship is used in classical approaches to deﬁnition where-
by a general noun, regarded as a class, is deﬁned ﬁrst by its genus and then
by the characteristics or differentia that distinguish its members from those
belonging to other subclasses of the genus. The knowledge hierarchies
resulting from deﬁnitions constructed in this manner—for instance, the
biological taxonomies—represent descriptive knowledge of essences and
as such are seen to mirror the formal structure of external reality.
The picture theory of meaning, and its corollaries, particularly the one
that holds that true propositions can be formulated within a logical calcu-
lus, has been one of the great generative conceptions of the twentieth cen-
tury. It still holds sway. In the bibliographic area, it inspired Feibleman to
develop a theory of integrative levels, in which the order of classes in a
classiﬁcation reﬂects reality conceived as a hierarchy of organized wholes
(Feibleman, 1954). Ranganathan built his classiﬁcation on the analogy with
a meccano set, assuming thereby that all knowledge could be built out of a
standard set of concepts and relations among them (Ranganathan, 1965,
p. 20). Fairthorne (1961) promulgated the notion of mathematics of classiﬁ-
cation. He thought that a classiﬁcation of knowledge could be formulated
as a lattice, a form of Boolean algebra. Wojciechowski (1971, pp. 17–18)
speculated about the survival value of a classiﬁcation, concluding that it was
proportional to the degree to which it was formalized and urged that
classiﬁcations be mathematized.
Designers of information retrieval (IR) thesauri seized on the distinc-
tion implicit in the picture theory between tautological and empirical knowl-
edge. They favored the former. Bernier, in the 1960s, argued that the rela-
tionships among terms in a thesaurus should be permanent, rather than
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transient, a priori rather than a posteriori, true in all possible worlds, rath-
er than contingently true (Bernier, 1968). In other words, only tautologi-
cal, in the extended sense of deﬁnitional, relationships should be expressed
in the independent semantics of a retrieval language; contingent relation-
ships should be expressed by its syntax, or not at all. The relationship be-
tween parrots and birds belongs in a thesaurus (all parrots are birds), but
not that between parrots and pets (only some parrots are pets). This dis-
tinction, which has found its way into several thesaurus standards, is some-
times expressed as the distinction between paradigmatic1  or context-free
relationships and relationships that are syntagmatic or context-dependent.
The distinction is important. First, it operationally deﬁnes what it means
to say a knowledge representation exists above or independent of any giv-
en database. Second, the two types of relationships, paradigmatic and syn-
tagmatic, have different roles to play in retrieval.
The picture theory of meaning lay ready at hand when computers and
the discipline of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) came on the scene. AI research-
ers wanted to develop computer programs to process information—to
understand language and to model inductive and deductive reasoning. For
the most part, the data structures they used to represent knowledge were
founded upon a referential theory of meaning; necessarily they were also
limited to relatively small sublanguages or microworlds. Winograd’s natu-
ral language understanding program dealt with the discourse that could
take place in the microworld of movable blocks (Winograd, 1972). For the
program to work, all knowledge about movable blocks had to be assembled
and represented propositionally. Implicitly it was assumed that language
understanding could be reduced to the mechanistic manipulation of ele-
ments within closed data structures.
Based on a similarly reductionist assumption is Minsky’s concept of
frame (Minsky, 1974). A frame is a network of nodes and relations. Frames
are used to represent knowledge about everyday or stereotypical situations,
e.g., a birthday party. Knowledge about birthday parties is of two kinds: that
which is always true, i.e., true of birthday parties in general, and that which
is true of only a particular instance of a birthday party. Always true or es-
sential (i.e., deﬁnitional) properties, like always true relationships, are con-
text-free and, thus, via inheritance or by hierarchical force, apply to partic-
ular instances.
Attempts have been made to use frame-based systems for machine-as-
sisted indexing in the medical ﬁeld (Humphrey & Miller, 1987). For exam-
ple, assume a document is assigned the term “bone neoplasm.” Bone neo-
plasm is an instance of “neoplasm by site,” a term that has associated with
its two attributes: histologic type and disease process. By hierarchical force,
bone neoplasm can be characterized by histologic type and disease process.
The indexer, thus, is prompted to supply values for these attributes.
To evaluate the effectiveness and expressiveness of knowledge repre-
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sentations that view meaning as referential in nature, it is useful to com-
pare this theory of meaning with another theory, the instrumental theory
of meaning. This will be done in the next section.
Instrumental Theory of Meaning
Wittgenstein ended his Tractatus with the now famous words “whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” (One of the questions con-
tributing to speechlessness was whether it is a true proposition that true
propositions mirror reality.) For many years Wittgenstein was silent, and
when he began writing again he did an about-face. He rejected the elabo-
rate ediﬁce of meaning that he constructed in the Tractatus and, in his new
work, Philosophical Investigations, and advanced a diametrically different
theory (Wittgenstein, 1953). (Such an about-face may be unique in the
history of philosophy.) Its premise was that instead of deﬁning the mean-
ing of a word in terms of its referent, it was to be deﬁned in terms of its use.
Meaning as use. Like most theories, this one has its antecedents. Frege
(Dummett, 1967) is credited with the dictum that words do not have mean-
ing in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein spun
out the implications of this dictum in almost excruciating detail.
The basic premise of the instrumental theory implies that we know what
a word means when we know how to use it. Words convey meaning both in
themselves and by virtue of the contexts in which they appear. Thus, what
a word conveys is, in part, variable, enabling it, chameleon-like, to assume
different meanings in different contexts; and, in part, ﬁxed. The ﬁxed part
is its dictionary or context-free meaning. Some words have meanings that
are more variable, more colored by context, than others. Words used in
scientiﬁc discourse, e.g., mass, are for the most part ﬁxed; their meanings
are not negotiable. To change the meaning of a keyword in scientiﬁc dis-
course and to have this accepted would be cataclysmic; it would amount to
a major paradigm shift. On the other hand, words used in, say, the social
sciences are regularly used with changeable meanings, e.g., the terms “de-
mocracy” and “culture.” It’s almost as if changing the meaning of opera-
tive words is needed to provide a new viewpoint, thus, advancing the fron-
tiers of sociological knowledge.
The instrumental or contextual theory of meaning if pushed to its limit
would construe every word, if not as a homonym, at least as a polyseme.
Polysemy is when a given string of characters has a set of different but re-
lated meanings. Homonymy is when the several meanings attaching to a
character string are unrelated. Culture with its more than 100 related mean-
ings is a polyseme. Mercury (the planet, the metal, the Greek God, the car)
is a homonym. The linguistic implication of even a moderate instrumen-
talism is that there are more words with multiple meanings in a natural
language than were ever dreamt of in the philosophies of empiricism. The
implication for the design of retrieval languages is that disambiguation is
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a serious and very large problem. It is the homonym problem writ large,
writ in the extended sense of including polysemy and contextual meaning,
that is the chief cause of precision failures—i.e., infoglut—in retrieval.
The solipsistic implications of extreme instrumentalism are toyed with
by Iris Murdoch in her novel Under the Net, the net being a semantic net. In
a normal world, however, solipsism is avoided by virtue of the fact that words
do have some shared public meaning. Intuitively, through experience and/
or some wiring in the brain, we know how to use words. We know rules that
govern their use. These rules are embedded in what Wittgenstein calls lan-
guage games. Subscribing to the concept of language games entails subscrib-
ing as well to the position that knowledge representations are not descrip-
tive of things and relations in the real world; rather they are descriptive of
linguistic behavior. The use of knowledge representations to organize in-
formation is one kind of language game, one kind of linguistic behavior.
To lay the groundwork for a discussion of the implications of the in-
strumental theory of meaning in the design of knowledge representations
for IR, it is useful to begin with why the picture theory of meaning was found
wanting.
• First, the picture theory assumes a universal form of language in which
the meaning of propositions picturing the world are prescribed, rela-
tively ﬁxed, and generally understood. The objection here is that pic-
tures can be differently interpreted. A cup is half full or half empty. A
picture of a duck from another viewpoint could be a picture of a rab-
bit; a picture of a block could be interpreted as a triangular prism.
• Secondly, the picture theory implies ﬁxity of reference. But the mean-
ings of words are not necessarily ﬁxed in the sense of referring to sets
of homogeneous objects in the real world or clearly delineated mental
concepts. Many words have ﬂuid boundaries. (A chair with three legs is
still a chair.) Fluidity is necessary if words are to function in a variety of
different contexts. The picture theory falls down particularly in the case
of abstract words whose referents are mental constructs2  and function
words, such as adverbial particles and prepositions.
• A third problem with the picture theory is that it represents knowledge
of the world as the conjunction of knowledge of independent micro-
worlds. To regard the totality of knowledge as a simple aggregation is
simplistic. Winograd’s block world and Minsky’s birthday world have
been criticized on the grounds that it is not possible to isolate micro-
worlds (Dreyfus, 1981). Knowledge is an encyclopedic tangle of inter-
related propositions. It is all of a piece; it cannot be fragmented. Not
surprisingly, a critical goal of AI research today is to develop an ency-
clopedic representation of knowledge. An example is the research be-
ing pursued by Lenant and his team (Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2001,
pp. A1, A18). Their Cyc database consists of over a million propositions,
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but in addition to this it contains information about the use of hundreds
of thousands of root words, names, descriptions, and abstract concepts.
For instance, a Cyc robot knows that anthrax can mean the heavy metal
band, a bacterium, or a disease. More signiﬁcantly it knows that while a
piece of wood can be broken into smaller pieces, a table cannot be bro-
ken into smaller tables. Knowing rules for the use of words, it “under-
stands” language behavior.
In sum: the picture theory lacks expressive adequacy; it does not ade-
quately represent knowledge. Knowledge is elusive, dynamic, and kaleido-
scopic. One cannot take a snapshot of it—or, as Heraclitus observed, one
cannot step in the same river twice. Wittgenstein in the Investigations dealt
a death blow to traditionalist empiricism and the idea that knowledge was
reducible to sense perceptions embodied in elementary propositions. Lan-
guage, when it is released from its picturing role, is free to go on a holiday.
(However, too much holidaying is where madness lies.) Thus, instead of
speaking about how we know reality, we talk about the different conceptu-
al schemes we impose on reality. Wittgenstein likens a concept to a style of
painting and asks, Can we choose one at pleasure?
What then are the implications of the instrumental theory for the de-
sign of knowledge representations? They are profound and include
• what we understand by classes, e.g., the classes in a taxonomy or classiﬁ-
cation;
• what we mean by subject;
• how we design relationships in a knowledge representation, such as a
classiﬁcation, thesaurus, or topic map;
• how we disambiguate terms to improve the precision of retrieval;
• how we go about trying to achieve semantic interoperability, solving the
problems involved in the merging of knowledge representations and in
creating a universal representation from a set of representations with
specialized domains.
The traditional way of looking at categories or classes is tied to an objec-
tivist theory of knowledge whereby a knowledge classiﬁcation mirrors reali-
ty. The backbone of traditional classes is the logical genus-species relation-
ship. The guiding rule in such classiﬁcations, ﬁrst stipulated by Aristotle, is
that classes should be mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive—the reason
being there should be no cross-classiﬁcation in nature. Membership in a giv-
en class is deﬁned in terms of essential properties; that is, two members be-
long to a class if they share the same essential property(ies) to a sufﬁcient
degree. Essences or properties can be expressed as speciﬁcations or condi-
tions for class membership. It is this view of class formation that is exploited
in automatic procedures used to identify entities such as works and subjects.
But are there common essences? Wittgenstein questions the tendency
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to look for properties common to all entities subsumed under a common
noun. When the meaning of a word does not describe reality but is a func-
tion of language behavior, the instances of its use need not all share a com-
mon essence; they can be similar to one another in different ways. The
categories represented by general nouns are similar to families: their mem-
bers belong there by virtue of sharing family resemblances. Some have the
same nose, some the same eyes, some the same tail; there need not be a
single property that all share.
The idea that categories are formed on analogy with family resemblanc-
es, rather than by matching on a given property, has been another of the
great generative ideas of the twentieth century. It underlies the paradigm
shift in the biological sciences that led to the adoption of the methods of
numerical taxonomy, which has had spectacular success in challenging the
traditional biological dichotomy that divides beings into those that are or-
ganic and those that are nonorganic. In the ﬁelds of logic and computer
science, it is manifested in fuzzy set theory and in bibliographic classiﬁca-
tion by the use of ambiguity operators. In IR operational deﬁnitions, using
similarity matrices of family-resemblance-type categories has advanced tech-
niques of automatic classiﬁcation. An example is the U.S. Census (PACE)
system, an expert coding system developed to analyze U.S. census response
forms (Creecy et al., 1992). Employing a vocabulary consisting of 800 in-
dustry and occupation categories, the system assigns terms to a candidate
response form by comparing it with other forms that have been manually
indexed—a large number of them. At a rate of 10 responses per second,
the system was able to classify 22 million responses in three months—a task
that if done manually would have cost 15 million dollars in labor costs. The
system was reported to perform with an accuracy rate of 86 percent.
The instrumental theory is relevant to how subjects are deﬁned. In chal-
lenging the limits of propositional knowledge, it implicitly challenges the
traditional view of what is meant by a subject. This traditional view is based
on a grammatical model implicit in positivistic approaches to meaning
(Svenonius, 1994). In grammar, the subject of a proposition denotes the
object spoken of, which could be a concept or a thing in the real world. The
role of the predicate of the proposition is to say something about that ob-
ject. The proposition “Snow is white” has as its subject snow; its predicate
says something about snow, viz., it is white. A number of propositions about
snow collected into a document would warrant saying that the document is
about snow or has as its subject snow. (That there is a repeated mention of
snow in these propositions is the rationale behind frequency-based tech-
niques of automatic indexing.) Extend the model further: a sufﬁcient num-
ber of documents about snow collected into a systematized body of knowl-
edge about snow would warrant hypostasizing a subject named Snow.
The traditional view of what a subject is belongs to a reductionist, pos-
itivistic theory of knowledge. As such it is simplistic. Subjects are complex
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and at times linguistically indeterminate. They are complex to the extent
that they represent not a single concept, but a system of concepts. As not-
ed, instrumentalism holds that the meanings of words—and, thus, words
used to name subjects—are in part ﬁxed and, in part, variable. The vari-
able part assumes its value by being contextualized within a system of con-
cepts. Any use of a word or words to name a subject emphasizes one of these
concepts more than others. “Basil” to a gardener has different connotations
than “basil” to a cook. Polysemy abounds.
Some subjects cannot be named; they are linguistically indeterminate.
Susan Langer in her book, Philosophy in a New Key, introduced the idea of
different kinds of symbolism (Langer, 1949). Music and art, on the one
hand, and written text, on the other, represent different symbolic transfor-
mations of experience. Only the latter, which employs a discursive symbol-
ism, is capable of conveying propositions. Sometimes music and, more of-
ten, art are representative in that they are about something: they have a
subject. Richard Strauss believed he could make music depict the cups,
plates, and silverware on a table. Paintings in medieval churches depicting
the lives of the Holy Family, apostles, and saints were used to enlighten those
who could not read. Generally, however, what is expressed by music and art
uses a presentational symbolism and tends to be linguistically indetermi-
nate in the sense that its subject, if it has one, cannot be encapsulated in a
word or phrase. Linguistic indeterminacy, however, is not limited to art and
music. Poetry often uses a presentational symbolism; belle lettres can have
subjects it would take an extended exegesis to depict. It may be possible to
describe in an essay what Moby Dick is about, but this cannot be named.
Nor are the various relationships employed in IR nameable. Traditional
subject-heading lists, thesauri, and classiﬁcations use generic see-also and
related-term relationships to link subjects. Attempts have been made to
regularize these relationships, that is, to introduce some consistency into
their assignment by stipulating the conditions under which they can be
used, e.g., the related-term relationship can be used between two terms if
they are associated by cause-effect, symptom-disease, industry-product, etc.
However, even a cursory analysis of related-term relationships in thesauri
will show many to be un-nameable.
An interesting, if somewhat quixotic, attempt to cope with un-name-
able relations was made by Farradane (1970).3  He argued that Boolean
operators were too generic to provide useful linking information and that
the speciﬁc relationships needed for discrimination could be derived from
a study of cognition. To this end he developed a system of relational oper-
ators based on Guilford’s psychology. The system involved two mechanisms:
three stages toward complete association and three stages toward complete
distinction. The combination of these yielded nine categories of relation-
ships, the names of which are somewhat arbitrary.
Attempts to show the effectiveness of these relationships in retrieval
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have not been conclusive. This does not mean cognitive psychology, which
has become considerably more sophisticated since Farrandane’s time, might
not yield useful relationships. It seems more likely, however, that useful
relationships can be discovered by studying linguistic behavior as evidenced
in users’ online search and navigation maneuvers.
The instrumental theory impacts how we disambiguate terms to achieve
precision in retrieval. To some extent the resolution of homonyms and
polysemes can be effected in the vocabulary of a retrieval language by the
use of parenthetical qualiﬁers. But given the meaning-is-use philosophy,
wherein most words are to a degree polysematic, it cannot all be done there.
Some of the burden must be shouldered by the relational semantics of the
retrieval language as these are lodged in its vocabulary structures (e.g., sub-
ject-heading lists, thesauri, and classiﬁcations), in its syntax or in both. Re-
trieval languages differ with respect to the types of relationships they ex-
press and where these relationships are articulated. An example of
disambiguation using vocabulary structures is the placement of “mercury”
in a number of different hierarchies, e.g., Greek mythology, metals, etc. An
example of disambiguation using the syntax of a language is the placement
of “ﬂight” in the syntagm “ﬂight of stairs.”
Knowledge Representations Embodied in Thesauri
and Classifications
As was mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the problem of knowl-
edge is approachable through language analysis and theories of meaning. The
theory (or theories) of meaning subscribed to by a retrieval language entails
a particular way of representing knowledge. The various knowledge repre-
sentations embodied in retrieval languages can be evaluated with respect to
their validity, their effectiveness in achieving objectives, and their amenabil-
ity to automation and semantic interoperability. To illustrate this, it is instruc-
tive to compare two different types of retrieval language, thesauri and ana-
lytico-synthetic classiﬁcations, e.g., the Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation (DDC).
Two structural differences distinguish retrieval languages that use the-
sarui from those using analytico-synthetic classiﬁcations (Svenonius, 2000,
chapters 9, 10).4  The ﬁrst difference is in their relational semantics. Many
thesauri, in accordance with established standards, try to limit their tree struc-
Table 1.
Temporary Fixed
Awareness Association Association
Concurent /ø concurrence /* self-activity /; association
Not distinct /= equivalence /+ dimensional /( appurtenance
Distinct /) distinctness /– action /: functional dependence
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tures to paradigmatic relationships, whereas classiﬁcations such as the DDC
freely admit of both paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships. As noted
earlier, paradigmatic relationships are those that are context-free, deﬁnitional,
and true in all possible worlds. Syntagmatic relationships are space-time de-
pendent, a posteriori, empirical, synthetic, and often transient. Another way
of drawing the distinction is between relationships that are logical, e.g., the
all-some relationships used in classical syllogisms; and those that are psycho-
logical in nature in the sense that they reﬂect ordinary language behavior.
The former may be said to mirror the world as seen by the logical-positivistic
lens; the latter creates the world as this is seen through the use of language.
Chief among the syntagmatic relationships embodied in classiﬁcatory
tree structures are the perspective hierarchies. These hierarchies serve not
so much the function of deﬁning scientiﬁcally—though they do this to some
extent—as to indicate a point of view or method of treatment. Whereas in
a thesaurus, following the all-some rule, rats would be given only the broader
term “rodents,” in a classiﬁcation; where this rule is relaxed, rats also might
be hierarchically related to laboratory animals. Moreover, in a traditional
thesaurus, the kinds of relationships that abstract concepts participate in
are limited, if for no other reason than they have fuzzy boundaries. How,
for instance, is a term such as “freedom” to be treated in thesaurus construc-
tion? To determine if it has a broader term, one must ask, All Freedom is
———? Possibly the blank could be ﬁlled in by “liberation,” but then “lib-
eration” would have to have at least one other subclass in addition to “free-
dom.” Compare this with the handling of “freedom” in a classiﬁcation like
DDC, which has a number of different hierarchical placements for Free-
dom, e.g.,
300 SOCIAL SCIENCES
320 POLITICAL SCIENCE
323 CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS
323.4 SPECIFIC CIVIL RIGHTS
323.44 FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Insofar as hierarchical perspectives such as these are based on literary war-
rant, they are reﬂective of linguistic behavior.
A second way thesaurus-based retrieval languages differ from analyti-
co-synthetic classiﬁcation is in their syntax. The syntax rules of a retrieval
language are used on the syntagmatic axis to combine terms to form syn-
tagms. In natural languages, syntagms may take the form of sentences; in
retrieval languages they may be called statements, subject headings, strings,
or chains. An example of a DDC syntagms is
323.4430976 [Free Speech in the South Central U. S.]
The contextualizing of a term in syntagm is an instance of its use; it is there-
fore a method of disambiguation.
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While there are exceptions, e.g., PRECIS, most thesaurus-based retrieval
languages index using descriptors; they do not employ a precoordinate
syntax. Thesauri for the purpose of improving IR emerged in the 1950s and
were predicated on the assumption that all the complicated syntax rules in
subject heading and classiﬁcatory languages could be replaced by Boolean
operators: the And operator would be used for discrimination, the OR
operator for collocation. In time, as the limiting nature of these operators
became apparent, proximity operators were introduced to exploit contex-
tual relationships as these occurred in the natural language of the databases
being searched. The relative effectiveness of pre- vs. postcontextualization
is part of the broader question of the efﬁcacy of vocabulary control, a ques-
tion beyond the scope of the present paper. Sufﬁce it to say that the pre-
contextualization of terms in syntagms offers the possibility of structured
displays to facilitate disambiguation through browsing (Svenonius, 1995).
As knowledge representations, thesauri are limited. First they are lim-
ited in what they can express insofar as they manage—and frequently they
don’t—to limit their hierarchy structures to paradigmatic relationships. Sec-
ond, they are limited in assuming Boolean and proximity operators are
sufﬁcient to express synthetic relationships. Being limited in what they can
express, they are limited as knowledge representations and, consequently,
limited in their ability to facilitate precision in retrieval. In comparison,
much can be said in favor of a classiﬁcation like the DDC. Compared with
other types of retrieval languages, it achieves a great deal of expressive
adequacy by virtue of the distinctions it can make. Using a notational cod-
ing, it can express complex subjects better even than word-based systems.
By virtue of its perspective hierarchies, it can express a great deal of rela-
tional information, more than can be expressed by traditional thesauri.
Trade-offs
Many years ago Shera introduced the term “social epistemology” to de-
note the study of the products of man’s classiﬁcatory behavior, which he sees
as being relative to both time and place (Shera, 1973). He believed each new
age required a new classiﬁcation of knowledge, which is to say each new age
represents knowledge differently. But might we not go even further than this
and suggest that knowledge representations, and the epistemologies upon
which they are founded, are relative also to purpose? In the design of a re-
trieval language, a decision must be made as to what knowledge representa-
tion to adopt. An obvious choice would be to choose one that adequately
expresses what knowledge is, i.e., the representation that ranks highest on a
validity scale. Such a representation might be expected also to rank high in
promoting precision and recall. With respect to expressive validity, a classiﬁ-
cation like the DDC ranks higher than traditional thesauri, being to a great-
er degree based on an instrumental approach to meaning—an approach that
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offers an alternative to a single picture of the world, one that is jammed into
the procrustean structure of logical hierarchies and propositional calculi.
But validity is not the only consideration in the choice of a knowledge
representation. It can be argued that as a knowledge representation be-
comes more expressive, its semantics become overrich, the plethora of
choice it offers confusing, and the elaborate rule systems on which it is
based make it expensive to apply. A retrieval language that incorporates
an expressive knowledge representation if too elaborate does not lend
itself to collaborative efforts in its creation and application. More serious,
it does not lend itself to automation, in particular to automatic indexing
and semantic interoperability, i.e., the automatic merging of two or more
retrieval languages. This latter is a Herculean task, one that amounts to
combining two or more language games and their concomitant rules for
play, a task difﬁcult in itself, and more difﬁcult especially if the languages
rest on different epistemological foundations causing them to differ in
every aspect of their vocabulary, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. Giv-
en these considerations and the need to deal in a timely fashion with the
increasing deluge of information pressing upon us, considerations other
than validity become relevant.
The knowledge representations resting upon the epistemological foun-
dations of logical positivism in its operationalist and representational ap-
proaches to meaning are further distanced from natural language than
those resting upon an instrumental approach to meaning. They are formal-
ized to a greater degree and as such are simpler, more uniform, and rela-
tively free from subjective interpretation. The objectivity they provide
through deﬁnitional rigor is essential for automated applications in retriev-
al, is useful in insuring consistency in programs of distributed indexing, and
is helpful in attempts to merge two or more retrieval languages.
Arguably, in the design of a retrieval language, a trade-off exists between
the degree to which the language is to be formalized and the degree to
which it is to be reﬂective of language use. As mentioned earlier, Wojcie-
chowski hypothesized that the survival of a retrieval language depended on
the degree to which it can be formalized. The truth of this hypothesis re-
mains to be seen, but certainly it is true that a highly formalized language
advances the twin goals of automation and distributed indexing. On the
other hand, the greater the expressiveness of a retrieval language, in par-
ticular the greater its ability to convey the contextual and relational infor-
mation needed for disambiguation, collocation, and navigation, the great-
er validity it has as a knowledge representation. Wittgenstein asked if we
could choose a conceptual scheme at pleasure. We might now ask, Can we
choose a knowledge representation for a particular purpose? Perhaps we
don’t always need a valid representation, when a useful one will do.
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Notes
1. The term “paradigmatic” is used in the indexing literature differently from its use in lin-
guistics.
2. Plato was the ﬁrst to address the referential problems attending abstract concepts. He
suggested that the referents of these were instances in the real world, e.g., the referent of
(the ideal of) “beauty” was the totality of instances of beauty.
3. Farradane is credited with being the ﬁrst person to use the expression “information sci-
ence.”
4. This is a broad generalization, one that has exceptions, but it is true in the main.
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